When managing complex systems, cognitive demands or problem-solving situations can appear in di erent ways. In some situations, problems surface gradually while being recognised, identi ed and treated. This category of situations has been labelled as`going sour' incidents. Within these incidents, there are a number of interesting and unique features warranting special attention.
INTRODUCTION Two Central Questions
The challenge to the human element in any system is ever increasing in maintaining safety and productivity, as systems become more complicated and/or the demand grows for better performance. At the same time, advances in computational technology have provided us with an enormous potential in decision aiding and information presentation. Consequently, there are more ways in complementing and supporting human cognitive capabilities in dealing with complex systems. This has prompted the need for a good understanding of the ways in which human agents (usually experts) interact with complex systems Rasmussen, 1986] .
In particular, this understanding requires answers to two central and complementary questions: in which ways does a task domain pose cognitive demands on a human agent, and how does a human agent meet those demands Roth & Woods, 1988] ? The answers are important not only for designing aiding mechanisms, but for training as well. As stated in a review paper by Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas and Sharolyn 1991] : \understanding the nature of knowledge, skills, abilities, and expertise associated with a task will help to determine methods appropriate to establish speci c task requirements and training needs." This paper primarily addresses the second question: i.e., in the context of complex system management, what are the cognitive demands and how are they placed on human agents? Going Sour' Incidents During the management of complex systems, problem-solving situations can appear in di erent ways. One means of categorisation is the \time constant" by which a situation becomes problematic. At one end of this categorisation spectrum, incidents commence abruptly and immediately absorb the problem solver's full attention . Often the solution to these situations is also drastic, such as shutting down operations completely. At the other end of the spectrum, incidents are not so evident at their onset, but problems gradually surface as they are being recognised, identi ed, and treated. The study of human problem solving in interacting with complex systems has typically emphasised crisis management. Whereas it is true that a gradually evolving problematic situation can also eventually lead to a crisis, quite often there is no clear evidence of an unfavourable outcome at the end of a session. Therefore the in uence of such situations is not always obvious in the statistical studies of general outcomes. For example, Cook, Woods and McDonald 1991] have compiled a corpus of cases in anaesthesia, the biggest category of which is this type of gradually evolving problematic incidents. They have labelled these as`going sour' incidents. Although the key component of such incidents is the time over which a situation evolves, there are a number of interesting and unique features that make this category of going sour incidents deserve special attention. Traditional laboratory settings have been shown to be of little use in understanding human problem solving in real life tasks, particularly in complex systems Cohen, 1991; Klein & Zsambok, 1991; Woods, in press; Klein & Calderwood, 1991] . Studies under more natural settings are needed. Our research takes the anaesthesia management system in surgical operating rooms as a \laboratory" for studying problem-solving in natural settings. The Domain of Anaesthesia In anaesthesia, the basic system being controlled is the human organism, which is complex and dynamic especially under surgical condition. The basic goals of anaesthesiologists in the operating room are to provide stable surgical conditions, while safeguarding the patient's well-being. Overview In this article, we present a eld study of going sour incidents during surgical operations.
The evolution of going sour incidents is depicted along with the task demands which the operator|the anaesthesiologist|has to meet for successful performance. Following an initial analysis of going sour incidents guided by Woods' four dimensions of complexity Woods, 1988] , and some in-eld observations, a set of hypotheses or claims on the task demands and incident evolution were generated. A eld study was initiated to examine these hypotheses. So far this on-going study has provided preliminary support for the hypotheses.
INITIAL ANALYSIS OF COMPLEXITY
To study the evolution and task demands of going sour incidents, it is important to realise that the general, dominating factor is the complexity of the system under control. Woods 1988] attributes the complexity of a system to four dimensions: dynamism, interaction among many parts, uncertainty, and risk. By analysing the impact of each of the dimensions, a number of features of going sour incidents can be predicted Gaba, 1991] . Typically there is great uncertainty in anaesthesia management, both in terms of treatment and of measurement. This uncertainty inhibits e ective interpretation of observed cues. Direct measurements of system status are usually not available, which will delay judgment and decisions regarding whether or not any interventions are e ective. In particular, some interventions will take a long time to elicit observable responses and lack of prompt feedback will delay diagnosis. Treatment will then have to start as early as possible and sometimes several possible diagnoses will co-exist. Some problems or concerns will persist for a long time because of the uncertainty about the magnitude of needed intervention. Although death due to anaesthesia management has become rare in recent years, the risk of injuring patients and delaying recovery is always a concern. This concern in turn tends to inhibit the use of drastic (but appropriate) measures, and turn may force practitioners to move gradually during intervention. In anaesthetic management there are a number of components, either from the viewpoint of human physiology or of the equipment being used. The number of subsystems involved and the interactions among them may delay diagnosis. The interactions may also induce new problems due to interventions made earlier, and any problem may have several causes. The interaction also calls for integrated solutions to seemingly separable problems. In addition, the changing environment adds to the complexity in that, over the span of problem-solving, hypotheses that have been excluded earlier may have to be examined once again.
HYPOTHESES AND FIELD OBSERVATIONS
A series of eld observations was conducted, during which time participating anaesthesiologists were also asked to recall past incidents. It was then found that recalled incidents were mostly, if not all, dramatic in the sense of causes and outcomes (for example, a surgeon poured cold antiseptic solution on the patient's heart, resulting an unexpected cardiac arrest). Some of these incidents were in fact published as special case reports (e.g., Doyle & Livingston, 1989; Doyle & Mark, 1990] ). This raises the question of the e ectiveness of past incident recall method, and underscores the importance of on-line observation and recording. The results from initial analysis and ndings from eld observations were synthesised and are summarised below as the research hypotheses guiding the present eld study. Problem-solving spans a long period of time. Compared to incidents that have a well-de ned onset point and clear cues, going sour incidents commence with unsigni cant cues. They require synthesising information over a long stretch of time for a proper treatment. Some variables increase their intensity gradually despite early treatment, and the underlying problem changes appearance slowly from one kind to another. Multiple hypotheses have to be maintained. The underlying problem often de es quick di erential diagnosis. Expertise certainly increases sensitivity to early cues of going sour incidents, but given their typical complexity, these early cues may be buried among other signals and possibilities. Long feedback times inhibit quick diagnosis. Some treatments (e.g., uid infusion) have a long feedback time and judgment of the e ect of a treatment is impaired by the delay. Only indirect measurements are available. Many of the measurements used are relative and their interpretation is subject to factors such as initial setup or individual di erences among patients.
Interventions are often required before de nite diagnosis.
Anaesthesiologists have to act on the basis of hypotheses and must balance di erent solutions in many situations. They can not wait until a su cient number of signs are observed. Trouble spots have to be checked repeatedly. The operating room is a constantly changing environment; hypotheses that have been excluded earlier may have to be re-examined. Integrated solutions are required. During the course of solving one problem, other problems can occur. Being able to integrate multiple threads and to treat them in a coherent fashion is important. Interventions complicate problem recognition. Quite frequently immediate interventions are needed to keep the patient's status within an acceptable range. Though not all situations intervened are dangerous to the patient's well being, they nonetheless increase the anxiety of the anaesthesiologist, and interventions can change or disguise the underlying primary problem. Active recognition of induced problems is essential. Treating one problem can cause others. Recognising these induced problems is as important as treating concurrent problems. Active identi cation of problems is central for a successful performance.
FIELD STUDY METHODOLOGY ISSUES
The study of cognitive demands in eld conditions has the advantage of observing problem solving processes in real-life tasks. Besides, the ndings obtained bear the in uence of problem solving strategies and expertise, as the task demand is closely tied to strategies to ful ll them. However, lack of control of working environment makes it impossible to be comprehensive. It is best used as a complementary method to other methods of analysing task demands. DATA SOURCE During each anaesthesia case, the anaesthesiologist was invited to`think aloud' as he performed his duties. He was told to include verbal protocols of what he was doing, what information he was using, and what hypotheses and predictions he was forming. Probing questions were posed to obtain further explanations of the actions observed during the case. These verbal protocols, plus communications with other personnel in the operating room, were recorded. Information from eld observations and follow-up interviews were also used in examining and analysing the verbal protocols. Transcripts were made and key episodes were extracted by identifying major events and activities. An anaesthesia case usually involves a number of threads, and the key episodes obtained were thus separated accordingly. An incident is de ned as the complete set of episodes along one thread. Operationally, a going sour incident is a set of episodes that cover a signi cant length of a case. Note that the anaesthesiologists were doing real-life tasks, and neither the end-result nor the nature of the incident being studied were known beforehand.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The results of four going sour incidents studied thus far basically con rm the claims made in the initial study summarised above. Example Case In the following, one particular incident is presented to show how the evidence collected was interpreted as support for the hypotheses. This case was used because it covers most area of the stated hypotheses. The reported set of episodes in this example incident is centred around the thread of uid management. The following describes the case from which the example incident was abstracted.
A 61 year old, 60 kg female had a pancreatic mass and an exploratory pancreatectomy was prepared for the possibility of a Whipple procedure (to treat pancreatic cancer). The patient had been receiving uid via an intravenous (IV) line overnight. The anaesthesiologist was an attending sta . Balanced anaesthesia was used for the case. Monitoring techniques included invasive arterial blood pressure (BP), central venous pressure (CVP) monitors, and urine output. The case lasted 6 hours and was considered to be a relatively smooth anaesthetic. Table 1 gives a summary of the pertinent episodes of the going sour incident in the example case. These events were synthesised and examined along with the hypotheses listed above, and are presented below as support to those hypotheses. Problem-solving spans a long period of time. The urine output dropped from 30 ml/h to 10 ml/h (normal range is generally above 50 ml/h) over a period of 20 minutes. Low central venous pressure (CVP) readings eventually led to the diagnosis of hypovolaemia (low blood volume). While the rst sign of a low CVP was observed early in the case, it was not resolved until near the end of the case. During this time, the anaesthesiologist had considered several hypotheses related to the ndings of low urine output and low CVP. Multiple hypotheses have to be maintained. Fault urine catheter had been hypothesised as a partial reason for the low urine output for a quite long period of time (for the reason listed below, i.e., trouble spots may present repeatedly), whereas inadequate uid infusion was the concurrent hypothesis through out most of the entire incident. At one time a nurse reported wetness around the IV site and a leaking IV was considered, and then excluded. According to yet another hypothesis considered, the surgeon may have pressed on the ureter's urine passageway. Long feedback times inhibit quick diagnosis. At time mark 10:51, the anaesthesiologist had restored the CVP and apparently he expected normal urine output to follow, but the long feedback time involved caused him to wait about 10 minutes before checking the urine output again. Only indirect measurements are available. Although the CVP at the beginning was low (which could be an indicator of a need for a higher uid infusion rate), the measurement was not absolute and was subject to changes in the position of the operating table, which had been adjusted several times around that period.
Interpreting Evidence
At the early stages of the incident, there were not enough signs to indicate hypovolaemia or a low urine output. On the other hand treatment would already be too late if enough signs were present! Trouble spots have to be checked repeatedly. The urine catheter was checked several times during this incident, because other personnel might have displaced them. Integrated solutions are required. At one point, the anaesthesiologist used a uid bolus to deal with the low blood pressure while tackling the low urine output. In this case, the anaesthesiologist was ghting low urine output and hypothesised hypovolaemia. While low blood pressure could have be treated di erently, increasing the IV rate with a bolus was the preferred choice. On the one hand, it was a continued, enhanced step for solving the low urine output problem, while on the other hand, it also restored blood pressure, as hypovolaemia was the hypothesised reason for the blood pressure drop. Interventions complicate problem recognition. During the hypotension episode at the beginning, it might have been that the patient was hypovolaemic (retrospectively speaking, according to the follow-up interview; but again, hypotension is only a weak cue for hypovolaemia.). Intervention to treat the hypotensive problem could disguise an important sign of hypovolaemia and delay the recognition of real underlying problems. Active recognition of induced problems is essential. In the incident, large amounts of uid were infused into the patient and could cause haemodilution (and other problems like metabolic acidosis), which required a haematocrit test to con rm its severity. On the other hand waiting for the signs of excessive haemodilution could have resulted in patient injury.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Some of the results obtained here coincide with Cook et al's 1991] analysis and Gaba's model of dynamic decision-making in anaesthesia Gaba, 1991] . For example, interventions appear in a gradual form, slowly increasing potency and power. In hindsight one is likely to conclude that a more aggressive approach should have been taken. As an example, in the presented case the anaesthesiologist actually mentioned that he would have acted more \aggressively". However from the case it can be seen that, in reality, going sour incidents do not provide su cient cues for early decisive treatment. (Interestingly enough, the anaesthesiologist incidentally made the prediction of a high urine output after discovering at the beginning of the case that the IV was running faster than desired.) In conclusion, complex systems management, such as in anaesthesia, involves many instances of problem solving. Problems can arise in a sudden fashion (e.g., ventricular tachycardia) and call for immediate solutions. However many times problems gradually present themselves with increasing severity. Very often a problem has to be treated even before it is con rmed. Identifying the task demands in going sour incidents adds to our understanding of cognitive demands of complex systems and performance needs for complex systems management and therefore provides a basis for training and equipment design. Note that other aspects in the study of complex systems|the ways or strategies with which the human agent meets task demands (or performance models according to Roth & Woods, 1988) 
